The Nature of Change

There are at least three ways to understand truth and consequently there are three ways to understand change. The three modes of truth include: 1) Statements that say, 'X is Y' and if X is Y then the statement is true, 2) The truth that if it ever was true will always be true, e.g. '2+2=4', 'God is tripersonal' etc. and 3) the kind of 'truth' of a hypothesis, 'If such and such a thing is true, then this and that will happen in a laboratory, this and that did happen therefore such and such is verified'; the law of scientific verifiability.

In the first instance, I can say 'The time is 10.45', and if the time is 10.45 then such a statement is true. The statement, 'It was 10.45, will always be true', but the statement 'The time is 10.45' will only be true when it is 10.45. Thus, the truth of the 'now' changes as things pass. So it is true that someone is reading these words at the moment, it always will be true that someone read these words, but after the person has finished reading these lines, it will not be true that they are reading these lines. This is the simply fact of change, change which is quite ordinary and which no one denies. This is why it is necessary to have conversations to the effect, 'What is happening in the economy today?', 'What is X doing today?', with the corresponding statement, 'The economy is booming today', 'X is in Paris today' and so on.

The second instance is the truth that never changes, cannot be subject to change. This is called eternal truth. The most simple form of eternal truth are those of mathematics. '2+2=4' say. If two plus two ever equalled four, it always equals four. One does not say that '2+2=4' was true for the Romans, or the Anglo-Saxons. One does not say, 'It is true that in Paris '2+2=4', but in London '2+2=5'. One does not say 'For Jones '2+2=4' but for Smith '2+2=5'. In other words, if ever it was true it is always true. It is truth from eternity, we (Man) do not make it true. God is another example, if ever God 'existed' he always existed and always will exist. Justice is another, one does not say 'For Margaret Murder is evil, but for Mary murder is good'. Murder is either evil or good, and if one or the other is always evil or good, for all. Such true imposes itself on man. He discovers that it is true and he cannot change its true. He does not make it true either, he does not say 'I feel "2+2=4" is true, or I make "2+2=4", I invented "2", "+", "=", and "4".' Put another way, it is truth that comes from above, eternally valid. Man may call it a mere tautology, but that would still not invalidate the fact that such a thing is always and absolutely true.

The third kind of 'Truth' is the most difficult and dangerous if misunderstood and misapplied. A hypothesis is posited, which is related to a problem. A test is set up in a laboratory to test if a hypothesis, the statement 'If X is true, then Y will happen under these conditions, Y did happen, therefore X can be verified'. These mean that while one might surmise that X is true one has not proved that such is the case, one has merely tested a hypothesis that has been verified favourably. Thus, hypothesises may change, become more complicated, have ever more complicated tests, and be superseded. This form of verified 'truth' can clearly change through time. No one accepts the early models of the atom as 'true', for they are indeed more primitive, likewise various new discoveries about molecular biology supersede older obsolete models. Scientific 'truth' however, presents probably the biggest problem for the concept of change, for it is the one area that the word 'progress' can be applied in the modern sense. It is undeniable for example that as a result of scientific advances we have more and more powerful technologies, more control over nature, and indeed the ability to almost invade the very 'stuff' of nature. Unfortunately it is also true that a scientific hypothesis can only be said to be true in so far as it has been verified. Even the law of gravity for example, can only be said to be a hypothesis which has been verified (quite convincingly we might say), but is not necessarily 'true'.

Change however, and progress in particular, are not a problem if a true understanding of the main modes of 'truth' is understood and how they may change through time. Scientism is a branch of the Enlightenment which, as we have said before, is most dangerous. There are wonders in the advance technology that is often coupled with a devotion to the Scientific Method. 'Science has discovered X', 'Science has created Y', 'Science has improved Z'. Yet with this comes a glaringly obvious fallacy, progress in technology, depth of knowledge in nature, the march of time to the 'old-age' of mankind, do not equate to a progress in society, depth of knowledge in general, or a repudiation of tradition and the so-called 'immaturity' of our ancestors. We may be 'in the modern age', in the 'now', we may have more 'stuff', and more kinds of 'stuff', and we may have highly complex hypothesises of the atom, the cell, a universe of strings, but none of this may be said to be progress in society in general terms. Real progress in society would be found in the moral field. Not just in an 'outer' culturally enforced morality, but in the inner true moral disposition of the soul. Progress in society would cultural, as well as moral, for the following of a cult is the only way to have a culture, and for a Catholic perspective the Cult of Christ would be followed. Christ, Saviour of all Mankind, would reign not only in public, but in private. Culture can develop on itself, improve itself, its expressions, not simply revolve perpetually. Culture would not be founded on fads and cycles, but on a real thing, the living person of Christ.

Cardinal Newman argued that without a knowledge of theology all other scientific knowledge was essentially empty. For theology, the Queen of all the Sciences, puts the others into their specific place. Since theology deals with God, the highest Being, the highest 'form', it is therefore the highest science, and all other sciences are subordinated to it, those which deal with lower levels of being, from the humane, right the way down to the lowest level of being, that of inanimate matter (the subject of physics). Making physics the highest, 'Queen of all Sciences', is like asking an atom to 'comprehend' an Angel (in fact anything that is ontologically higher than it), or like asking a one dimensional being to understand the concept of a X and a Y axis, never mind a Z.

This is rather a side point, the real point is that change, while a problem in psychological sense, is not really a problem actually. The fact that today I am in London, while tomorrow I am on the moon is no more important than the fact that one year I may be a pagan, the next a Catholic. What does matter is Eternity, and Eternal truth. One might look at the Catholic Church and say: 'You claim to hold to eternal, unchanging, immutable, infallible Truth!, yet you have 4-5 different confessions of faith! What gives?'. And this is where the difference between the 'religion of progress' and real development reside. A Truth may be truly stated, without being as developed, or as discerning. 'God is One and tripersonal', is a true statement, concerning a True thing. 'God is One, The Father, Son and Holy Ghost, the Son is Eternally Begotten of the Father, and the Holy Ghost precedes from both the Father and Son, Eternally', may be a more discerning statement of the same Truth. With the Credos of the Church each is a true statement of the unchanging deposit of the Faith, but they become more and more discerning, they express the same Truth more deeply. Rather than simply changing our 'truths' when new data arrives, or our passions change, or anything else, and denying the possibility of fixed truth, which is so often the case with the sons and daughters of flux.

The principle of development is quite simple when understood, and it is in fact the true principle of progress. For one can never progress, or even understand the notion of progress, unless one has a fixed standard, a thing to progress from. Since, Truth exists from eternity, logically, anything which brings us closer to that Truth, or is able to discern that Truth more accurately, is progress in itself. Does this mean that things do not change? Of course not, we still have truths changing. One can say here is an acorn one year, and here is an oak tree the next. Accidental qualities may be in a state of flux, but the fact that we may say 'Acorn to Oak tree' tells us that even in this world of fading, contingent, mutable, flux there are still 'substantial' realities to grasp. The 'stuff' the tree is still present, even if it all its accidental qualities have passed into memory. The same with a person: 'He is wearing green this season', 'He has this idea now', 'He was damaged by X experience', 'He now speaks German'. 'He' is still there, even if his accidental qualities may have changed, his soul, his being is still present; the very 'stuff' of himself, his 'I', are constant, if they were not then we would not be able to comprehend the changes in his accidental form. He, like the tree, may develop also, towards Truth. Thus, he may say the Apostles Creed one year, then the Nicene Creed the next, then the Tridentine Creed and finally the Credo of the People of God. All of them are True statements, all of the developments on the original Truths of the Faith, and he may have developed in his understanding of these same truths.

In a world of existential despair we feel very much that if we simply renounce our devotion to 'pure flux', to 'the nature of un-nature', to 'making ourselves, bringing ourselves in to being', to 'the immortality of time', to the 'now', and dedicate ourselves to eternity, to higher Truths, we may begin to correct not only societal ills, but personal ones as well. Let us look forward, but let us also look back. Let the 'democracy of the dead' have its vote, and then take it onwards and forwards and right the way into Eternity!

The Poverty of Modernism

"My attitude toward progress has passed from antagonism to boredom. I have long ceased to argue with people who prefer Thursday to Wednesday because it is Thursday". G. K. C

There is a certain fallacy, which was actually recognised quite excellently by Karl Popper, called historicism (not to be confused with the art movement of the same name). It is in fact, bound up in that same category of modernism (I mean here only a very general use of the term, that is to say, any philosophy that is connected 'being modern', rather than the particulars of certain late 19th century early 20th century movements). Modernism is absolutely tied up with Liberalism, and practically all modern errors relate to the fallacy of Liberalism (to be explored in a separate post "By Reactionary").

Popper defined historicism thus:

I mean by "historicism" an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principle aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the "rhythms" or the "patterns", the "laws" or the "trends" that underlie the evolution of history. (Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, (London, 2007), p. 3)

Popper certainly offers a strong critique of historicism based on what he calls a methodological mis-understanding of naturalism, or physical science. That is to say, he believed that the anti-naturalists as well as pro-naturalists actually misunderstand the 'true' methodology of science, and specifically naturalism. Most of what he says is true in so far as he identifies problems with the writing of history, the more seditious forms of scientism (one only needs to consider Hitlerism, Roosevelt's New Deal, et al.), and the blind faith in evolution as a law. (Popper does suffer however, from his own problems which consisting of his own brand of scientism, his brutal reductionism, and his narrowing of 'truth' to verifiable hypothesises, and reality to the ontological 'level' of inanimate matter).

The particular brand of historicism that is most widely applied, and which is most certainly the more dangerous form, is the type that looks to evolution in biology and 'applies' the same to the historical and sociological sciences. This blind faith in an upward progress in human life lies at the heart of most peoples errors relating practically any discipline. Darwinism itself, as opposed to the science itself, suffers from a certain degree of historicism and in fact relies on teleological assumptions. Two of the most common errors are the Marxist and the Whiggish (or Liberal) interpretation of history.

For Marxist historians there is an upward movement in the historical setting. Human society, human ideas, art, music, culture etc are essentially reducible to economic realities. These realities work as a dialectic, two forces a thesis and an anti-thesis must clash to form a new synthesis in society. So most typically a Marxist may say the feudal landlords were one half (the thesis), the peasants are the other half (the anti-thesis), we then see a clash of peasants against landlords in the middle ages (1381, 1524-25, and the Reformation would have been the intellectual peasants revolt), which formed a new synthesis the bourgeois and the workers, with the rise of liberal capitalism. In this model it is the economic agents that work out the dialectic of history; ideas, justice, religion all follow from that. The problem with a dialectic is that it would in theory continue for ever, and each agent would be absolved of all responsibly for his actions (for they were determined by their class status, itself rigidly defined). However, a Marxist cannot believe that the dialectic will continue onwards for ever, thus they tend to view history as a Purpose. The working out of True Humanity, of the progress of the march of time. Hence, Marx believed the 'end' of history lay in a workers utopia, a stateless, labourless time. Yet the logic of a dialectic does not allow for a stoppage, unless history becomes some sort of god, which develops to perfection through time, unless there is something outside of the mere dilectic to which is more fundamental.

Marxism is fairly easy to refute, for its own contradictions and its own narrowness expose it well enough. Whiggery on the other hand is much more difficult to attack, for its ground is ever shifting, and many see its principles as good in themselves. In its most gratuitous form it simply states that, that which is modern is better, that the past is backward, that humanity is ever improving. This more simplistic form can be seen clearly in the arrogance of the enlightenment thinkers (the very term 'enlightenment' is an indicator of this arrogance). Kant said:

Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of the enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding! (E. Kant, 'An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?' in Kant: Political Writings, ed. H. S. Reiss, (Cambridge, 2006), p. 54)

This immaturity is any state that, as far as Kant is concerned, is not 'free'. Any traditions, or traditional ideas, must be challenged for the sake of challenge and for freedom. If men submit to 'dogmas' they are unable to think properly. 'Dare to be wise!' In other words, the only way to be wise is to think, and to think ones way out of past dogmas. Kant rejects also the notion that knowledge, particularly religious knowledge, can ever be fixed. 'A contract of this kind [an unalterable dogma of faith say], concluded with a view to preventing all further enlightenment of mankind for ever, is absolutely null and void, even if ratified by the supreme power'. Kant offers no explanation as why such should be so, but simply lets it stand that 'enlightenment' is the only way that mankind can go. Kant posits then a kind of cultural relativism, but as with all relativists he is more dogmatic and rigid than any true Dogma. He constructs therefore a Universal purpose:

The history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally- and for this purpose also externally - perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely (E. Kant,
Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose', in Kant: Political Writings, (Cambridge, 2006) p. 50)

Kant's idea of a universal history, equates simply to the asocial sociability of man working antagonistically through time, until Reason unwittingly works its course. Mankind is set on a path that he cannot see (except with enlightenment). There is a melancholy haphazardy in which wars are fought, men make stupid mistakes and so on, which brings out the ultimate purpose of history. The rational state, the perfect state, where men can be completely enlightened. Kant is optimistic about what the future will hold, because he believes Man is steadily improving through time, and his own time is better than all previous ages. This theory of progress suffers however, from the a simply mistake; it is a huge begging of the question. How, if all is change, flux, if no dogma may be laid down for all time, if no standard exists outside of man, how could one understand such a concept as 'better' or 'worse' or 'Enlightenment'? Why is the 18th century such a privileged century, that men could suddenly become enlightened, mature? Unless one simply states that one is more enlightened then there is no answer. As for progress how does one demonstrate that we have progressed? Technology, perhaps? Politics, maybe? Technology may be more powerful, sophisticated etc., but how does one measure progress in politics, economics, society, culture?

Skipping ahead a little, and bypassing the 19th century which also possessed its fair share of faith in progress, and its whiggish world view, we can still see the faith in progress in spite of the failures of the enlightenment project, and the witness of the bloodiest century of human history. Francis Fukuyama is among those whose faith in progress is so complete that he cannot think outside of it. His book 'The End if History and the Last Man' is essentially an apologia for liberal, capitalist, democracy. He writes a justification for world Americanisation and dismisses everything that it not liberal, democratic, capitalism as an immature state of human life, which will in time reach the 'old age' of mankind if it grows up.

His line of arguing is absolutely horrid, and his book is riddled with contradictions, yet he is taken seriously. The essence of his argument runs thus:

1)We have liberal democratic capitalist states emerging all over the world, even after a century of seeming failure of liberalism (the Holocaust, communism, fascism etc).

2)Therefore, there must be some way to explain why liberal democracy and capitalism are the victors on the world stage of politics.

3)There are many theories of history, including Marx's theory which are bunk. However, Hegel (one of the first to have a modern systematic theory) gives us a starting point.

4)Man's nature is he has no nature, he is completely undetermined, yet he is bound by his historical setting, or consciousness.

5)History is dialectical, that is a mixture of thesis/antithesis and synthesis, all of which is unknown to historical actors, and can only be known by subsequent generations looking at history and telling its story.

6)History is irreversible. The strongest example is science and technology. With the scientific method, new and more powerful machines could be made, Man's dominion over nature could be more complete, and technology is definitely progressed. The scientific method always leads Man to more control, and can never be lost now that it has been discovered. Therefore, history can never 'go backwards'.

7)Nevertheless, history may end, in the sense that Man may reach the pinnacle of reason, his final end. This is in built into the Reason of history, a 'Tran-historical standard'. Men work, wholly unknowingly, the dialectical mechanism of history, until they reach the 'end' freedom, and the perfect satisfaction of the thymos (struggle for recognition).

8)This just so happens to be liberal, democratic capitalism. Thus, man has progressed to the last state he shall ever be in, reached his old-age. All that needs to happen is every society on earth to 'catch up' with America, Europe and Japan, and leave their 'pre-modern' state, so they may enjoy 'freedom' and may perfectly satisfy their thymotic nature.

This is a very basic summery of his argument, it takes him an excessive amount of time to get to the point, and he re-writes his first principles half-way through his book, which is immensely annoying. However, if one looks at the manner of his argument we encounter more problems relating to modernism, and its offshoots of historicism. We have here an uncritical devotion to the 'modern', that which is 'now'. He speaks as though we are today somehow in the best position, for we have the most understanding, the most perfect system. Chesterton says, 'Tradition... is the democracy of the dead. Tradition refuses to submit to that arrogant oligarchy who happen to be walking around'. Frankly, the dismissal of traditional societies and cultures merely because they can be recorded in history books, and are 'in the past' is hardly convincing. Fukuyama uses the phrase 'less reflective ages', as if St. Augustine, St. Thomas, St. Ambrose, St. Pius V, or whomever were somehow less able to think, reflect and discover universal principles. He also justifies the horrors of the past, for without them mankind could surely have not gotten to were it is now. Thus, the Holocaust, Soviet Russia, Communist China, the whole lot had to happen in order for liberal democracy to come out as the summation of human achievement and the 'end' of human development.

The final point about Fukuyama and I think the most damning, is also the one that crushes a majority of modernist philosophies, including the root problem Liberalism. It is the making of human reason, and also to human existence the highest level of being; the separation of Faith from Reason, while having a blind faith in Reason; and cultural/philosophic relativism. In reply and in simple terms man is a rational creature, but his reason is entirely insufficient for comprehending the highest levels of being. In all of the theories about history there is always a higher principle, which has somehow revealed itself to mankind in the 20th and 21st centuries. Yet how does reason discover 'Reason' in history. If all man's actions through time are merely the result of his 'un-nature', antagonisms, strife, 'asocial sociability', conflict etc. which happen to work out 'Reason' through time, such a 'Reason' would be undiscoverable. Especially in the light of the fact that man's conscience is bound up in his time. Even if 'Reason' could be discovered all of the enlightenment philosophers, and all their followers are bound up in the same inevitable historical situation. One could never know the 'end' nor the purpose, for one is always bound by the 'now', and by ones historical conscience.

The separation of Faith from Reason is so utterly ridiculous that it need not be discussed at any great length. Simply put all rational knowledge must be taken on by faith. Therefore, the most rational thing will appeal the intellect and be taken on by faith, if you like this equates to belief (assuming the will is also good). No one, for example, can live existentially, for to do so would require a complete separation of ones soul from all 'other' existence, and a concerted effort to 'exist' and to bring all 'extension' into existence at all times. Such a reality is pure nonsense, and ends in the contradictory notion of solipsism. One must have rational knowledge and faith that such is rational and therefore to be believed. If one is referring to the supernatural, theological virtue of Faith, then reason is a lower faulty, which is the handmaid of Faith, but Faith cannot not a contradiction to Reason, nor Reason Faith, for ones reason determines where ones faith is.

The final part ties in with the first two. Cultural/philosophic relativism is the primary myth of the modern world. Simply put if relativism is true, then I’m the only person who exists, I pre-existed myself, I brought myself and all extended reality into existence, there is no such thing as inter-subjectivity, and there is no reason why I should be writing an blog entry for an uncreated, insubstantial fictional world present in the extended reality of my mind. Additionally, language or any form of communication is meaningless, since it is pure flux itself, and there can be nothing, no essence whatever that can be created, or discovered, to get us out of the pure nonsense of chaotic flux, since, by having such an essence, we would necessarily have to discard relativism. If one posits something like, 'The nature of man is to have no nature', then that is the end, there is nothing to discover about man he has any meaning. Nothing outside of him, or intrinsic to him has any meaning. He cannot create meaning or discover meaning, for to do so would refute the first principle of having 'no nature'. There must of course be a fixed principle, something from eternity, which can illuminate our subjective and contingent consciences, and we must have a nature to talk about 'Man as man'. If not, then that is the end of the discussion, for all conversation, all action, all being is necessarily meaningless and incomprehensible. If the subject (the person) is the only 'actual' or 'verifiable' reality, and there is nothing outside of the subject that can be known, then the world becomes a lonely place, with the means of communicating (and communing) completely shot. The individual cannot be the only authority, Authority must exist from eternity outside of individual conscience, otherwise there is no such thing as authority.

The original point of this essay was to expose the particular errors of historicism, but by doing so we see also the primary errors of modernism, or liberalism. The other motive for this essay was to attack another brand of historicism, which is often called feminism. The funniest (and also saddest) thing about feminism, is that it is anti-feminine, that is to say the male virtues are held in such a high regard by feminists that they feel they must discard their own 'inferior' femininity for 'superior' masculinity; they must be men in order to be equal. Of course feminism has its origins in liberalism, which was derived from Protestantism. It is culturally Protestant (that is to say, it was Protestantism which breed an anti-female culture) and philosophically liberal (that is to say, liberalism, which was basically an extention spiritual autonomy to social/political autonomy, in the feminist form, did the same for women against men). In the history of the ideas, feminism is traceable to the English Civil War, with the ferment of crackpot ideas that occurred . Katherine Chidley is seen as one of the first women to 'oppose' patriarchy, entering into the public sphere, and asserting her spiritual and political automony. Historical writing on the subject however, is painfully historicist. Always is there an assumed 'universal purpose' of history for women to have their rights recognised by society, or more particularly the destruction of 'patriarchal' society by women obtaining the 'phallus'. This ludicrous doctrine, apart from being derived from abhorrent principles, and the most misogynistic men that have ever lived (Fraud, Sartre et al), is pure historicism and suffers from the same mistakes as all modernists. For example, how could any of this be known? More importantly how can this be measured, verified, even understood?

(It is amusing that the most patriarchal society in the world, the Church, venerates as the perfection of humanity, Our Blessed Mother Mary, Queen of the Universe. Protestants lost true femininity when they smashed her statues and called veneration of Our Lady, 'the mummeries of superstition'. As a result Protestants lost their perspective on femininity to such a degree that they inevitably became anti-woman).

I say with Chesterton, I am no longer antagonistic with progressives. There really isn't any point, they cannot imagine anything but perpetual change. If they wish to keep believing Thursday is better than Wednesday because it is Thursday then so be it. I am bored with arguing the point, just like I am bored with arguing that murder of Children, even for the preservation of the mother, is evil. Change must be challenged and if we succeed, we will, amusingly enough, see change for real!

Distributism: Irreligion is the Opium of the People

The evil of such a thing [Communism], because the essence of such a thing, is an idea. And those who understand a stunt, a scare, a slogan, a catchword, or a caption, never do understand an idea [hence the evil of it is never spoken of]. It is something that exists before any of its manifestations; it is something anterior to policy, a programme, or a propagandist movement; it is simply a thought.

[...]

[Communism has some good in it, but it is sought in the wrong way. The critics], ‘are right when they rebuke the Bolshevist crimes of massacre and pillage; they would be still more right if they also rebuked the Capitalist crimes of usury and chicane’

The evil should not be called Bolshevism but Marxism; or perhaps a particular policy founded on the materialism of Marx. To realise it, its opponents would not only have to endure the pain of thought; they would require the moral courage to read the literature of the people they denounce; and it is much easier to denounce it…. [a Marzist propagandist] does not justify it that it may be established he would rather establish it that it be justified. He would set the material forces at work, and treat the moral forces as if they were material forces; that is, use them rather than agree with them. Among this moral forces would be discontent; but he does not use it because he thinks it divine discontent. [He would use it to create his own contentedness]. It is rather a bestial or vegetable content; not as a question of quality, but rather of its process of production. It is imposed by forces upon men…. For instance, the hatred of religion does indeed break out into blasphemy and sacrilege, and maxims like “Religion is the opium of the people.” But this, which is the largest part of the scandal, is the least part of the evil. The more subtle Marxian carefully explains that he would not denounce faith merely because it is false, or preach abstract atheism because it is true. That is mere idealism or “ideology”; his is the practical atheism that would produce by any means the material state in which he hopes that men would be materialists. For that purpose he will if necessary be moderate, not to say hypocritical. His principle is that principles are not good until they have become practice. It is that prudence that is for us a heresy from hell; and worse a hundred flaming churches. For it is a war against the will; a denial of the primal right of the mind over its own thought and choice; a hideous nightmare of the cart dragging the horse. It is true in the sense that there can be no debate, but only war, with those who think that they cannot really think. For any conception of popular rule it is, of course, a paralysis. Materialism makes citizens as such merely passive. Irreligion is the opium of the people. (G. K. C., 'Straws in the Wind: The Crime of Communism', No. 128. Sat. Aug. 27, 1927.)

This long quote from G. K's. Weekly does bring forward some interesting points about the nature of the problems not only with Socialist/Communism but also with modern society in general. It reveals the fallacy of establishing the reality of materialism without having any basis for that reality. The materialist is not interested in setting up materialism because it is right, but simply setting it up because he feels it is practical. And surely this is logical to the materialist, for there cannot be a realm of abstract ideas, for such a notion would refute his materialism. Hence, he must set up his material reality, he does so because by doing so he can pretend that their is nothing spiritual. It also makes a telling point about the nature of evil. That it is as much an error of ideas as it is a weakness in the will. If we start from faulty premises we can never achieve right conclusions, even by accident. Likewise, if we start from true premises but have not the will to follow them we will not achieve the right conclusions.

'Irreligion is the opium of the people'. Chesterton, turns the famous Marxian phrase on its head, and in fact hits upon something that is entirely true. One of the chief reasons why Catholicism and Communism are incompatible is not simply because the former burned Churches, killed priests and all that, but that both Catholicism and Communism appeal to religious sentiments, to spiritual forces. However, while Catholicism fully acknowledges that it is a spiritual entity Marxism fails to do so. Marx would say that ideology merely follows economic reality, as Christopher Dawson puts it:

Now, Marx himself did not regard ideologies as of prime importance, since they were to him merely the theoretical reflection of social realities which are primarily economic and material. But he fully recognizes - no thinker more so - that ideology and sociology are indissolubly linked, i.e., that Capitalism, bourgeois society and Liberalism are three aspects of the same social reality.

Hence Marx,

admired its [bourgeois societies] material achievements and power, its conquest of the world by machinery and economic organization. He appreciated still more its revolutionary organization:… its thoroughgoing secularization of life. [Capitalism was the first step towards Communism]… But on the other hand Marx was bitterly hostile to the ideological side of bourgeois culture - that is to say, to the liberal ideals which the bourgeois themselves regarded as the real justification of their material achievement. [Class exploitation, was to Marx, was the real goal of liberal ideology]. (Christopher Dawson, Religion and the Modern State, (London, 1935), pp. 60, 63)

Thus, Communism seeks to continue the path of secularization of life, the subordination of man to economic conditions. It takes the place of the Capitalist society; but it seeks to destroy class exploitation. Communism actually attacks the part of Liberalism that was the continuation of Catholicism, the moral standards (rationalized by 18th philosophers), and approves the part which is in conflict with Catholicism, that is materialism, secularized life and irreligion. When a modern justifies Capitalism he does so not on grounds that it is more just, or morally acceptable, or more humanitarian, but rather on the grounds that it is most efficient, or practical, or realistic. In other words, it is not a moral system, but a practical system, one that 'works'. Here Communism and Capitalism are united against Catholicism. Inverting the hierarchy of values, a 19th century idea, and putting work, labour, or economics above morality, ethics, and politics justifying materialism and irreligion. It appeals to the base appetites. 'Satisfy your lower instincts, your material needs as much as you like'. Leave morality, contemplation to those 'superstitious' types, to 'celibates in ivory towers'. Material practicality, utility, these are things that ordinary people can understand, the base passions must rule.

We are entirely deadened to spiritual realities. Irreligion satisfies lust, and lulls us into a coma. If all that matters is the base, material realities then any system which can satisfy them on the largest scale must be the 'best system' we have. This is way a Catholic and modern find it so difficult to communicate. Not because a Catholic does not have base urges, or material ambitions, but because he has subordinated his lower state of being to his higher ones. He speaks of spiritual values, even while the word spiritual is incomprehensible to a modern. The word spiritual, to a modern, might have something to with a relegated past 'Age of Faith' where a few pious people sat around and mumbled prayers, but not something for practical people in an 'Age or Reason', in the 'Old age of Mankind'.

Yet ironically the materialist philosophies are still spiritual, again Dawson says:

Communism is the perfect example,..., for it represents the culminating point of the secularising process in modern civilization, and it is at the same time a reaction against that tendency in so far as it is an attempt to go beyond politics and in a sense beyond economics also and to restore to society a common faith and a common sense of spiritual solidarity.

The strange paradox of a godless religion and a materialist spirituality has its basis in internal contradictions of the revolutionary tradition of which Communism is the final product. For that tradition unconsciously drew its dynamic forces from religious sources, though it denied and rejected them in its rationalized consciousness. In the same way the Marxian theory of history, for all its materialism, is dependant to a degree that Marx never suspected on the antecedent religious view of history which had been formed by Jewish and Christian traditions. (Ibid., pp. 71-2)

In other words, irreligion while lulling us into a coma and drugging us with material things, is still dependent on religious sentiment, and in fact still possesses that empty shell of the Christian religion. With Communism, the State really did become God. All things were subordinated to the glory of Russia, for example. In a Capitalist state, with its de facto materialism, there is still a contradictory devotion to 'human rights', 'freedom' and so on. We also find weird pseudo-religious cults springing up, but often they present themselves as a consumer product. (You only need to walk into a local book shop and go to the 'Spiritual' section to see what I mean). Even the material sciences become a kind of religion, you only need to hear phrases such as 'Darwinism allows one to be an intellectually satisfied atheist', to realise there is more to materialism than simply Matter. The very idea that the 'Beauty' of the Universe is enough to satisfy cultural needs (while wholly absurd) suggests that there is something ontologically different from mere matter which can actually understand 'Beauty'. Thus, irreligion deadens the higher spiritual values, while at the same time expresses itself through them.

Irreligion really is the opium of the people!

Mr. Chesterton's Hat

"No one who has followed those things of interest can have failed to mark the important part played in Mr. Chesterton’s spiritual expansion and, lately, in the popular development of the League, by Mr. Chesterton’s hat. I do not suggest that the influence of Mr. Chesterton’s hat is to be compared with the influence of Mr. Chesterton’s head, for they are things in their nature different. But I do feel that when we have paid proper tribute to Mr. Chesterton’s head, a distinct and separate homage is due to Mr. Chesterton’s hat.

Deliberately I suggest that the homage to the hat should be distinct and separate; because it is characteristic of it that it very seldom performs its normal function of covering his head. I speak figuratively, I would have you know. It is continually being blown off his head, to illustrate the ravishment of man’s dignity; and being chased down the road, to illustrate the splendour of human endeavour; and being blown on to his head again, to illustrate the wondrous bounty of Providence; and being sat upon, to illustrate the divine simplicity of humour: in short, its life is passed in a perpetual whirl of wild hatly adventure.

Even in the comparatively rare moments when it does repose on his head, it is rather as a banner than as a hat. Then it is the symbol of individuality of his personal freedom and of his personal dignity. Before an astonished world it flaunts the legend: “Chesterton-- one and indivisible”. And in this way the hat has so faithfully served Mr. Chesterton and, through him, us; has so often gone out of its way, as a hat, to provide us with a parable; has sacrificed in our interests so much of the normal ease and comfort of a hat’s life; that it seems inevitable that it must take an honoured place in the symbolism of the Distributist state. I do not suggest that it will be adopted as a national crest, for I take it that in a Distributist state each man’s hat will be his own crest; but undoubtedly it will be regarded with honour as the prototype of all proper and heraldic hats.

And here, at weary last, I come to my point, which is that, in view of this, it is of the utmost importance that we should leave for descendants an exact and graphic account of the Chestertonian hat, as it appeared in life. If we fail in this it is certain that strange heresies will spring up around it. In a century or two, perhaps, there might be erected, bestriding the Thames, a statute of Mr. Chesterton in a golfing cap. Conflicting schools of thought might visualise it as a bowler, or as a top hat, or as a crown, or as a shako, and base all their philosophy upon the fallacy. And it is certain that out of the welter of evidence there would finally arise the inevitable scientist, who would prove conclusively that the hat never existed, that the myth merely embodied humanity’s yearning throughout the ages for hat-perfection.

But let me make it quite clear that I do not offer myself for the post of Recorder of the Hat. I lack the talent and vivid and accurate description which the work must demand. If a mere impression is of any value at all to record, let me say at once that, sensible as I have shown myself to be of the hat’s unique public services, as a hat it simply repels me. Indeed, in a list of “Reasons for Thanking God that I am not Mr. Chesterton,” which I once wrote, for my souls good, drew up, the third or fourth article read “I do not have to wear Mr. Chesterton’s hat.” To those who know only my hat, this sentiment my seem fanatical, unreasonable and violent; but those who know Mr. Chesterton’s hat, will, I think, understand.

On the whole, I think that the work should by done by some expert, a hatter’s auctioneer, perhaps, who would be able to appreciate the thing and note its features with technical accuracy. And appended to his record, there should be certainly be a short biography of the hat. Is it, in fact, as I have heard disaffected men declare, a mass-produced hat? Or did Mr. Chesterton, as I prefer to believe, years age, in is early youth, weave and fashion the thing with his own hands, from the materials produced from his own ground? This is an important matter, and it should be made clear.

And now let me apologise to Mr. Chesterton for having deliberately written upon his hat. If I am to vindicate myself at all, it must be upon the grounds which he once took when he vindicated, in the abstract, the conduct of a man who sat upon another mans hat. He declared that the action might be excusable if the motive was pure, as, for example, if it were done for the amusement of children. I have written for the instruction of children, of generations unborn. And I claim in further extenuation that, while Mr. Chesterton can, so long as the inexplicable desire possesses him, continue to wear is hat even after I have written upon it, it is unthinkable that any man could wear again a hat upon which Mr. Chesterton had once sat." ('Mr. Chesterton's Hat', G. K's. Weekly)

Distributism: What is Change?

(The Storming of the Bastille)

It seems to be the penalty of those who say things are always changing, that they never realise when things really change. There are many modern examples; some of which are now rather ancient than modern; notably that of the grim grizzled Die-Hard the Darwinian. His whole theory is one of endless change; and yet he cannot recognise or reconcile himself to the obvious change of a challenge to a hypothesis nearly fifty years old. He talks as if the very shape and nature of a man might melt and alter, as in his own story of the monkey; he often seems to agree with that German Darwinian who said that man is something to be surpassed; but he instantly revolts at the very idea that Darwin could be surpassed. While he is presumably ready to discuss whither the Superman will have three legs or nine noses, he will not extend such flexibility from noses to notions; least of all to the notion which is the foundation of his own nightmares. Or again, the Socialist who set out for Utopia at the end of the nineteenth century insisted that men would change their conditions, even the most primary conditions of owning the clothes on their backs or looking after the health of their babies; the one thing he never contemplated was that the Utopians who were this changing their homes and habits might possibly change their Utopia. Therefore to this day the older type of Socialist is still vaguely bewildered by the Distributist; and cannot understand why his is not merely a Capitalist or frankly a Communist. So again the Capitalist, when is also was a sort of Futurist, always saw the future filled with more and more machinery or finance; he was solely occupied in proving that modern men would soon have as much machinery as they wanted; he was rather mystified when yet more modern men want to know whether they can have no more machinery than they want. The Daily Express capitalist will always hail hopefully a men machine or new invention; he seems incapable of seeing a new situation. He really seems to think that England, merely by announcing that she will never fight anybody, can always go on bullying everybody. (G. K. C. 'A Socratic Symposium- Straws in the Wind', G. K's. Weekly, July 18, 1935, Vol. XXI, No. 540)

Chesterton strikes a chord here about something that ought to be remembered. Change is a fundamental factor and reality of life. Someone might say then, 'Well Chesterton has a point, these men the Darwinians or the Socialists could not recognise a change in the situation, but are you New-Distributists not making the same mistake as them?'. I answer that, while it is true that we no longer live in the 1920s and 30s, and that era, its problems and conditions are no longer with us, we live in an age which has yet to wake up to Chesterton's advice. Who can deny that we still live with the Darwinists who cannot admit that the theory could change, except in cosmetic details, or an age when liberal democratic capitalism is actually called the 'end' of history, that man will never change because he has reached his final destiny. I also believe that when some truth has been struck, particularly one that is common to mankind, that whatever the poverty of past attempts or schemes to implement it, the scheme cannot be identified with the truth as such.

This is certainly the case with Catholicism. Its dogma's are universal, in that they appeal to universal principles are above the merely parochial. ‘Go forth and baptise all nations’, a simple mission, restore the race of Adam, in Second Adam, ‘restore all thing’s in Christ’. However, the implementing of this, and the dogma itself are not completely identical. Men can err, no system can perfect men by simply being a perfect system. Thus, a bishop may cause damage the faith, believing himself to be in faithful service. His office may be perfect, he is not guaranteed that same perfection.

A similar line of arguing, I believe, may be made for Distributism. It is a peculiar modern obsession that property is somehow a stigma, that families are something that you are thrown into without any choice, that babies are the single curse of women and that work is the means to leisure. Most men and women today could not imagine that any argument could be brought to challenge these modern peculiarities other than a belated, hypocritical rightism, the mere appeal to ‘traditional’ values. They cannot conceive that their minds may be captured in a cult of change, (perpetual revolution, ‘Obsessive Contemporaneity’, ‘Trendomania’, fadism) that admits of no change to the cult. They are incapable of accessing higher levels of being, they are fixated with the simply inanimate, material, extrinsic, externalistic aspects of ontology. Finally, they are obsessed with the words ‘Freedom’, ‘Liberty’, and ‘Modern’. They declare that Capitalism, enlightenment, science, democracy grants the most of these things, gives the most of it to the most people, and that each of these things are good in and of themselves. They cannot admit of a challenge to these words. They merely stand up and declare ‘We are Free, liberal and modern’ without any substantive proof of it. What if Freedom means something different, what if it is a metaphysical, not merely physical concept? What if liberty is not simply, ‘freedom from tradition’, but is rather ‘freedom from sin and error’? What if we are all ‘modern’ and that such a concept begs the question, what is progress?

Nonetheless, we see men and women dedicated to the ‘ever new’, without ever challenging the ‘ever new’. Distributism is ‘ever new’ however, in the real sense, because it is also ‘ever old’. The first fact about Distributism is that it is a tried and tested dogma. Where widely distributed property is present, and a real respect for the family as the centre of civilization visible then society is stable. Whenever, these things disappear we lose our senses, and even our ability to sense.

Do I think that Distributism as it was expressed in the 20s and 30s needs to be followed with a kind of fideism? No. But neither did the Distributists of the Weekly. The goal is a sane economy, the method is a subject for debate. The scheme may change, sanity (because it is based on sense) never changes. Chesterton once said of Christianity, that it had not been tired and found wanting, rather it had been found difficult and left untried. The same might be said of Distributism. Would it be hard to create a Distributist state in the 21st century? Sure. Should difficulties deter us? Surely not!. (This is the second time this essay that I have used an example paralleling Catholicism. I do not like to ‘secularise’ Catholicism, but illustrations and parallels can be drawn here since Catholicism is in a sense the ‘model’ of truth, being Truth itself).
To conclude then we should turn to Chesterton:

Now we do not admit that anything moves endlessly on one direction in so simple a style; but in practice we often feel that the progressive is the person who had not moved at all. When early in every year there comes that hopeful revolution, that happy revolt, when the hedges are shooting and the bull rushes out, we do not believe that the world will go on growing greener and greener forever, until every man is a Green Man and every flower a Green Carnation; and everything, animal, vegetable, and mineral is given over to the wearing of the green. But we do see something strange and sad about the Poet of the Spring still sitting and declaiming that the winter is past and the rain is over and gone, when he is sitting in the snow all covered in icicles; exulting in change without noticing that there has been any change; even in the form of a chill. And there are some proposals, and one in particular, which remind me rather of an attempt to perpetuate departed Spring in the middle of winter, by painting everything bright green; even to the point of wearing Green Shirts.

Now to my instinct Distributism is a change of direction and not merely an acceleration of advance. And the Distributist is called a stick-in-the-mud; not because he wishes to stick in any mud; but because he refuses to march any further along the particularly muddy path which has been called the path of progress. (Ibid.)

Do we want to ‘go back’ to a better time? Sure. Are we going to do so by failing to admit that things change? Absolutely not! Let us be intransigent. Let us 'stick-in-the-mud'. But let us remember that we still need to go forwards, just forwards away from the cliff edge, and guarding Truth!